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Abstract
English nominals constructed with the morpheme {-s} as a so-called possessive marker 
may be assigned an indefi nitely large number of interpretations depending on the 
context of utterance. This raises interesting questions concerning the interface between 
semantics and pragmatics, most obviously concerning the more specifi c nature of the 
contextually invariable encoded content of the morpheme as well as the contribution 
made by that content to the process of comprehension. This article aims briefl y to 
suggest one solution to these problems by proposing an underdetermined procedural 
semantics feeding into a principled cognitive process of inference as proposed within 
the framework of relevance theory.
1. Aims
This paper is going to address the issue of the meaning of the {-s} mor-
pheme in possessive constructions in English within the general frame-
work of relevance theory (Sperber/Wilson 1986/1995). By possessive 
constructions I mean what is more traditionally referred to as the geni-
tive1, for present purposes encompassing primarily the distributional 
patterns Taylor (1996) calls:
(i) the prenominal possessive (John’s bike; the boy’s mother)
(ii) possessive nominalizations (the enemy’s destruction of the city; the 
city’s destruction by the enemy)
1 I will not address the issue of whether {-s} is an exponent of genitive case. This 
is a matter of some contention. My own opinion is that {-s} in Modern English is an 
enclitic.
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(iii) possessive compounds (children’s books; doctor’s degree)
Moreover, I will be concerned with the distinction between in particular 
the prenominal possessive and the competing postnominal of-construc-
tion, as in e.g. the boy’s mother / the mother of the boy and John’s bike 
/ *the bike of John.
My aim is basically to seek a unifi ed account of the encoded content 
of the {-s} morpheme – or possessive2 marker, as I will also refer to it 
– in all its potential environments, one which may provide an adequate 
basis on which to explain the occurrence of what seems to be an indefi -
nite number of meanings attributable to nominals in which {-s} occurs. 
My proposal as to the semantics of the possessive marker is thus in-
tended to unite pragmatically determined representations within an in-
ference-based interpretive framework, viz. relevance theory.
2. The problem
Why should the possessive marker be worth bothering with at all? From 
a meaning-based perspective possessive constructions are interesting 
largely because of the indeterminate number of interpretations to which 
they seem to be amenable. A simple nominal such as Peter’s shirt might 
on the face of it refer to the shirt owned by Peter, the shirt worn by Pe-
ter, the shirt Peter designed, the shirt he painted, or photographed, or 
has stolen, or written about, or whatever. Clearly, the possessive mor-
pheme is either exceedingly polysemous, or else the encoded content it 
brings with it into the nominal is suffi ciently abstract as to be compat-
ible with a very wide range of meanings indeed. As such, we appear to 
be dealing with a phenomenon eminently suited to enquiry into the se-
mantics/pragmatics interface; the data will point either to a wholly se-
mantic account or to some division of labour between semantics and 
pragmatics.
Thus, if we contend that in a given context (1) below is assigned the 
interpretation in (2), to what extent is (2) then attributable to the en-
coded semantics of {-s}? And in the event that the contribution of that 
encoded content is only partial with respect to a relevant semantic cate-
2  As the title of this paper also indicates, I choose – in the interests of terminological 
parsimony – to retain the term ‘possessive’, although I do not, as will become apparent, 
consider ‘possession’ to be encoded.
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gory such as SOURCE (cf. Peter is the source of the ‘shirt’), how does 
the hearer then arrive at the interpretation in (2)?
(1) Peter’s shirt is horrendous.
(2) The canvas Peter has painted and which portrays a shirt is horren-
dous.
The task here, then, is fi rst to propose a semantics for {-s}, and then to 
suggest in what way that semantics is signifi cant in the process of utter-
ance interpretation.
3. Theoretical coordinates
Intuitively, it would make good sense to strive for a unitary account 
of the possessive morpheme covering the entire range of construction-
types in which it occurs. In the interests of descriptive parsimony alone 
such an account would certainly be preferable. In general, I adhere to 
the methodological principle known as Modifi ed Occam’s Razor, a me-
ta-theoretical principle of economy put forward by Grice which states 
that “Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity” (Grice 1989: 
47). As Carston (2002: 184-185) puts it, this:
 entails that, instead of positing a linguistic ambiguity to account for 
multiple interpretations of a linguistic expression, pragmatic princi-
ples and inferences, which are independently motivated, should be 
employed, wherever possible.
While this in itself calls for neat description, there are other reasons 
for preferring an account minimising the role of encoded semantics. 
Any assumption of cognitive economy in the comprehension process 
would seem to run against a polysemous account whereby the posses-
sive marker is construed as encoding multiple meanings across a wide 
semantic fi eld. To the extent that the human mind is geared to minimis-
ing the cognitive effort expended in the interpretation of ostensive stim-
uli – as argued by relevance theorists – it would seem likely that human 
language is structured in such a way as to accommodate or refl ect that 
state-of-affairs.3
3  Here it might be argued that the simplest model would be one whereby meaning 
is fully encoded and dependent only on automatic retrieval by a linguistic input sys-
tem. Generally, however, so-called ‘code’ models of communication are rejected by 
relevance theory as being cognitively untenable.
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I assume that the general idea that linguistically encoded meaning 
underdetermines ‘what is meant’ (to use Grice’s term) is uncontrover-
sial, and that the idea that the semantic entry for the morpheme should 
list all such highly specifi c conceptual senses as might occur at any time 
in any instance of discourse consequently may be dismissed. More con-
testable is the notion that encoded content underdetermines the propo-
sition expressed, i.e. the explicit content of the utterance, or ‘what is 
said’. This idea is forcibly presented in relevance theory, particularly in 
the work of Robyn Carston, who refers to the claim as simply ‘the un-
derdeterminacy thesis’ (Carston 2002: 19). Recent work in the emerg-
ing fi eld of lexical pragmatics has shown that even the encoded content 
of conceptually fat lexical items, ‘content’ words, would appear to be 
underdetermined with respect to their explicit meaning (Wilson/Sper-
ber 2004).
A monosemous account, then, seems favoured by (i) the assumption 
that the cognitive architecture favours simplicity insofar as processing 
of linguistic input operates on underdetermined rather than conceptual-
ly full-fl edged representations; (ii) the assumption that the interpretive 
system is architecturally geared to minimising effort; (iii) Modifi ed Oc-
cam’s Razor, the general methodological principle of descriptive econ-
omy. Further, if we accept a distinction between procedural and concep-
tual semantic content (see Blakemore 2006), we can suppose that pro-
cedural content at least will be fairly unambiguous. To the extent that 
{-s} is procedural, as I will presently claim, this would clearly further 
reinforce a monosemous approach.
If, then, we are to suppose that {-s} encodes an unambiguous and 
underdetermined semantics, this means that we have need of some the-
ory of verbal comprehension that will allow us to account for how, ex-
actly, the hearer of, say, (1) arrives at an interpretation such as (2). This 
brings us into the domain of pragmatics. I have already noted that rele-
vance theorists fundamentally reject notions of communication relying 
exclusively on processes of encoding and subsequent decoding of more 
or less specifi ed semantic content (see Sperber/Wilson 1986/1995). In-
stead, human communication generally is construed as essentially in-
ferential. That is, in the case of verbal communication, utterances are 
taken to encode a schematic semantics which is decoded automatically 
by a linguistic input module resulting in the hearer representing a so-
called logical form. This is a blueprint requiring inferential manipula-
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tion in order for the hearer to be able to construct a representation of the 
speaker’s informative intention, i.e. what it was she intended to convey. 
The goal of an inferential pragmatics is thus “to explain how the hear-
er infers the speaker’s meaning on the basis of the evidence provided” 
(Wilson/Sperber 2004).
The account of utterance interpretation provided by relevance the-
ory is grounded in “a general claim about cognitive design, the claim 
that human cognition is geared towards the maximisation of relevance” 
(Carston/Powell 2006). Relevance itself is seen as a potential proper-
ty of input to inferential processing. More specifi cally it is a matter of 
‘cognitive effects’. An input may deliver cognitive effects by yielding 
new assumptions, or by providing evidence that strengthens, contra-
dicts or eliminates existing assumptions held by the hearer. Relevance 
is a trade-off relation between processing effort on the one hand and 
cognitive effects on the other: an assumption is deemed optimally rel-
evant to the extent that it provides maximum cognitive effect for a min-
imum of processing effort. Central to the theory is the communicative 
Principle of Relevance (Sperber/Wilson 1986/1995):
(3) Communicative Principle of Relevance
 Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal rel-
evance.
Any ostensive utterance thereby conveys as part of its encoded con-
tent the assumption that it is optimally relevant to the hearer, i.e. that 
processing it will yield a maximum of cognitive effects. What all this 
means is that the process of interpretation, far from being a haphazard, 
hit-or-miss kind of activity, is in fact highly principled. It proceeds thus 
(Carston/Powell 2006):
 [The principle of relevance] licenses the hearer to consider possible 
interpretations in order of their accessibility (that is, to follow a path 
of least effort) and to stop as soon as he reaches one that satisfi es his 
expectation of relevance.
My claim here is that the problem of accounting for the relationship be-
tween the context-invariable encoded semantics of {-s} and contextu-
ally assigned meanings associated with nominals in which it occurs can 
be solved within a relevance-based framework.
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4. The semantics of {-s}
Nominals constructed according to the possessive schema ((N1-s) N2) 
have been variously construed in terms of meanings such as posses-
sion (Peter’s new car), kinship (Paul’s sister), and part-whole relation 
(Mary’s nose), to name but three. Often, the concept of possession is ex-
tended so as to provide a broad frame of semantic reference with which 
to associate the meaning of the possessive marker. Clearly, such con-
ceptual categories are less descriptive of {-s} than they are of the nomi-
nals in which {-s} occurs. Equally, if we are to say simply that {-s} en-
codes possession in some very broad sense, we need to specify exactly 
what we mean by that concept. As it stands, it would seem merely to be 
a convenient label for something much more abstract and much less ex-
pressable. Taylor (1996) contends that construing the semantics of {-s} 
simply in terms of ‘abstract relation’ is less than satisfactory. Partly be-
cause he sees ‘possession’ as being a default reading of any nominal 
token involving {-s}, and partly because such a meaning would fail to 
account for some distributional constraints on the occurrence of {-s}, 
for example:
(4) the car’s headlights
(5) *the headlights’ car
Here, the contention is that the notion of {-s} as encoding merely some 
abstract or unspecifi ed relation between entities would wrongly predict 
interchangeability in the sequential relation between the two nominals 
in the schema. Likewise, such an account would fail to explain why we 
cannot generally employ {-s} in order to predicate relations between 
just any kinds of entities. For example, as Taylor points out, while Brit-
ish speakers, at least, entertain clear ideas about some kind of general 
relationship existing between the entities fi sh and chips, such a relation-
ship cannot be expressed simply by means of the {-s} marker:
(6) *the fi sh’s chips
(7) *the chips’ fi sh
The semantics of {-s} has most recently been construed by Langacker 
(1995) in terms of what tends to be referred to as the ‘reference-point 
model’, cf. Langacker (1995: 58):
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 The reference-point model is simply the idea that we commonly in-
voke the conception of one entity for the purposes of establishing 
mental contact with another.
Taylor (1996) elaborates slightly on Langacker’s proposal, suggesting 
(1996: 17) that:
 in opting to use a possessive expression, the speaker is instructing the 
hearer on how best to identify the referent that he, the speaker, intends. 
The speaker, that is, invites the hearer to fi rst conceptualize (‘establish 
mental contact with’) the one entity […] with the guarantee that this 
will facilitate identifi cation of the target entity.
In the main, I concur with a reference-point analysis insofar as I con-
sider {-s} to encode procedural information directing inferential ma-
nipulation of conceptual content towards a relevant representation. Spe-
cifi cally, {-s} instructs the hearer to represent N2* (i.e. the concept ex-
pressed by the nominal N2) as part of world N1*, where world N1* is 
the set of contextual assumptions stored at the conceptual address acti-
vated by the nominal N1. For instance, in a simple nominal like (8):
(8) that man’s wife
the noun phrase that man (N1) activates a concept THAT MAN (N1*) 
that provides a context of associated assumptions (world N1*), re-
trieved from the conceptual address or else constructed ad hoc. At the 
same time, the possessive marker {-s} encourages the hearer to repre-
sent the concept WIFE (N2*) activated by the noun wife (N2) as part 
of that set of assumptions (world N1*). This means that assigning ref-
erence to (8) is dependent on resolution of the kind of relationship that 
is predicated to exist between the two entities, this being a pragmatic 
process of relevance-driven inferential computing in context.
The semantics of {-s} is thereby procedural, rather than conceptual 
in nature insofar as it is an instruction to the hearer as to how the con-
ceptual content of the nominal is to be cognitively manipulated. The 
possessive marker does not merely encourage the hearer to represent 
some notion of ‘unspecifi ed abstract relation’; rather, it encodes a spe-
cifi c instruction to integrate one concept within the set of assumptions 
associated with a second concept. This is a unidirectional operation, 
and as such it refl ects the non-interchangeable sequential nature of ex-
amples like (4) and (5) above.
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Note that the notion of a procedural semantics is on the face of it ful-
ly compatible with a framework such as instructional semantics. Where 
instructional semantics and relevance-based pragmatics diverge, how-
ever, resides in the fact that only relevance theory attempts to account 
for exactly how a procedural, or instructional, semantics contributes to 
cognitive processing of logical forms. While an instructional approach 
quite reasonably might assign the kind of semantic content to {-s} as is 
proposed here, a relevance-based account will further seek to explain 
in a principled manner exactly how that content inputs to a full-fl edged, 
cognitively relevant representation. The two approaches are hardly in-
compatible; they merely differ in terms of their explanatory scope.
In what way then does encoded content contribute to the representa-
tion of possessive-marked nominals in specifi c contexts of utterance?
5. Interpretation
Let us start by considering the concept of possession. As noted, Taylor 
(1996) considers some notion of possession to be a default reading of 
nominals involving {-s}. This is a claim that, in the absence of any ob-
vious context, linguistic or otherwise, that would point to some other 
interpretation, a nominal like (9) below will be construed as meaning 
something like (10):
(9) Peter’s car
(10) the car Peter owns
On the face of it, this seems reasonable. It is clearly the case, however, 
that if we replace car with some other noun, the possession reading be-
comes less obvious, as the simple example below illustrates:
(11) Peter’s absence
Possession obviously has to be some much more abstract notion than 
our everyday understanding of the concept, so abstract in fact that it be-
comes tantamount to the wholly unspecifi ed relation that Taylor quite 
reasonably objects to. Moreover, while there is no reason to suppose 
that linguistic items cannot encode both procedural and conceptual con-
tent at the same time (see Nicolle 1998), it would seem to be an unnec-
essary “multiplication of senses”, to use Grice’s words, and thereby a 
contravention of Modifi ed Occam’s Razor, to suggest that this is the 
case for {-s}. Not least because any ‘possession’ representation, in the 
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more current sense, would seem clearly to be dependent on the kind of 
lexical environment in which {-s} occurs.
Thus, all things being equal, an utterance of (9) is likely to activate 
a series of assumptions about Peter, these being either retrieved from 
memory or else constructed ad hoc. Two such assumptions are quite 
conceivably (12) and (13):
(12) Peter is an adult human.
(13) Adult humans very often own cars.
Given (12), (13) is immediately accessible and therefore of low cost 
to processing. A simple relevance-driven process of non-demonstra-
tive inference employing (12) and (13) as premises will yield as a so-
called implicated conclusion an assumption to the effect that Peter’s car 
means ‘the car that Peter owns’. To the extent that this provides cogni-
tive effect and is compatible with expectations about the speaker’s in-
formative intention, this will be a relevant interpretation and processing 
will stop. At no point do we need to postulate ‘possession’ as an encod-
ed representation.
Indeed, my claim is that any specifi c meaning assigned to a nominal 
involving {-s} can be accounted for by positing the above semantics as 
input to inferential processing guided by principles of relevance. An-
other example:
(14) the car’s headlights
Constructions like (14) tend to be assigned a partitive interpretation 
whereby the entity expressed by N2 is taken to be a part of the whole 
that is expressed by N1. Again, this is easily accounted for if we sup-
pose that the encoded content of {-s} is as outlined above, and that the 
lexical items involved activate concepts whose encyclopaedic proper-
ties include assumptions like (15) and (16):
(15) Cars have headlights.
(16) Headlights are parts of cars.
Partitive readings are in such cases immediately accessible interpreta-
tions yielded by the same kind of inferential process as posited above 
for (9).
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One obvious demand on the theory is that it should be able to ac-
count for well-attested distributional constraints such as those exempli-
fi ed below:
(17) a. the car’s engine
 b. the engine of the car
(18) a. John’s school
 b. *the school of John
(19) a. ?the house’s roof
 b. the roof of the house
Since the possessive marker instructs the hearer to integrate N2* into 
world N1*, the nominal occupying the N1-slot must be capable of ful-
fi lling that function. That is, it must exhibit certain properties. Collec-
tively, we can refer to these in terms of cognitive utility. A nominal will 
possess cognitive utility value to the extent that it activates a cognitive-
ly salient concept, i.e. one that is easily accessible and relatively rich in 
terms of the kinds of encyclopaedic assumptions that may be accessed 
at its conceptual address or constructed online. We might expect cog-
nitive utility to be closely linked to ontological categories, so that fi rst-
order entities, for example, will tend to have greater utility value than 
second-order entities, and so on:
(20) Peter’s laptop
(21) ?the laptop’s screen
(22) Peter’s idea
(23) *the idea’s aim
Here, the relatively high salience of the fi rst-order entity expressed by 
Peter means that the possessive marker will readily attach to the noun, 
whereas the relatively low salience of the second-order entity expressed 
by laptop means that {-s} will attach less readily. Similarly, the third-
order entity expressed by idea, which presumably has least salience, 
means that {-s} arguably is more likely to be rejected. We should note, 
however, that there are clear tendencies, especially in American Eng-
lish, towards a marked extension of the domain of the possessive mark-
er, so that {-s} now increasingly attaches to nouns previously deemed 
less than amenable to such marking (see Rosenbach 2003). Moreover, 
salience should clearly not be regarded as an invariable property of en-
tities. Rather, it is invested in them by cognitive subjects. So while a 
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second-order entity might most immediately seem to be potentially less 
salient than a fi rst-order entity, it may nevertheless be invested with 
greater salience in the run of discourse. This allows for the attachment 
of {-s} to nouns which in terms of the ontological status of their deno-
tations might appear less than amenable to possessive marking, as for 
example in (21) above.
Hawkins (1981) has proposed a semantic hierarchy of sequential re-
lations to account for the distributional relationship between {-s} and 
the competing postnominal of-construction:
(24) [HUMAN] < [HUMAN ATTRIBUTE]] < [NON-HUMAN 
ANIMATE] < [NON-HUMAN INANIMATE]
Here, the arrow indicates sequential precedence, so that human entities 
are taken to assume precedence over human attributes, and so on. The 
hierarchy accounts neatly for examples like the following:
(25) a. Mary’s brother
 b. the brother of Mary
(26) a. Mary’s car
 b. *the car of Mary
(27) a. the ship’s funnel
 b. the funnel of the ship
So, in (25) the two constructions alternate freely due to the equal stand-
ing of the two human entities in the hierarchy. By contrast, in (26) the 
postnominal of-construction is blocked due to Mary having sequential 
precedence over car. In (27) both constructions are again freely avail-
able due to the equal status of the non-human inanimate entities ex-
pressed by ship and funnel. Examples like the school’s pupils, which 
ought to be excluded by the hierarchy, but which nevertheless certainly 
occur with signifi cant frequency, are explained in terms of social insti-
tutions, such as schools, which are essentially defi ned by their depend-
ency on human activity, being cognitively invested with human proper-
ties whereby they advance, as it were, up the hierarchy.
Hawkins’ framework does not, however, account for the unaccept-
ability of examples like (19a); in this particular case, both nouns de-
note non-human inanimate entities and as such ought to be freely in-
terchangeable. Yet this is clearly not the case. Neither are we able to 
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suggest that house is suffi ciently characterised by human activity as to 
allow {-s} attachment in the same way as school. Note also that school 
itself will also reject the possessive marker when collocated with a noun 
like roof. Obviously, the situation is more complex than Hawkins’ pro-
posal suggests, and it would seem that a full account should include not 
only the nature of N1, but also that of N2. This will not be part of my 
endeavour in the present article.
Hawkins’ proposal equates with a notion of cognitive utility or ‘top-
icworthiness’ (Taylor 1996). It is descriptively useful insofar as it would 
seem to account fairly adequately for the relative distributional patterns 
of the two competing constructions. However, it does not provide any 
clear picture of the relative semantic status of the prenominal and post-
nominal possessive forms. Indeed, Hawkins suggests that the two forms 
are synonymous, both encoding some notion of ‘intrinsic relation’. This 
may be less than satisfactory. The examples in (28), from Taylor (1996), 
are by no means necessarily co-referential:
(28) a. Chomsky’s students
 b. the students of Chomsky
I suggest that, while the semantic content of {-s} instructs the hearer to 
integrate N2* into world N1*, the postnominal construction is seman-
tically distinct. Thus, Tyler and Evans (2003), working within a frame-
work of cognitive semantics, construe the encoded content of the prep-
osition of in terms of an intrinsic relation between Trajector (TR) and 
Landmark (LM) entities. Adopting this proposal allows us to account 
for examples like (28).
Thus, the nominal in the a-example instructs us to represent N2* as 
part of world N1*. We can reasonably assume that among the assump-
tions it is likely to immediately activate will be e.g. (29) and (30):
(29) Chomsky is someone associated with students (e.g. a university pro-
fessor).
(30) University professors teach students.
That being so, it is but a short inferential step, given the principles of 
relevance, to an interpretation along the lines of (31):
(31) the students taught by Chomsky
131
Conversely, the b-example in (28) encourages the hearer to represent 
N1* as being intrinsic to N2*. Among the assumptions immediately ac-
tivated we can expect to fi nd (32) and (33):
(32) Students are intrinsic to Chomsky by virtue of Chomsky being insert-
able as an object in the schema (student STUDY x).
(33) Studying Chomsky primarily involves studying his work.
On this basis, a relevant interpretation will be (34):
(34) the students of Chomsky’s work
Distinguishing between the semantic content of the two constructions 
also allows us to account for their co-occurrence in examples like (35), 
whose relevance rests on their being distinct from a related nominal 
such as (36).
(35) a friend of my mother’s
(36) a friend of my mother
Following the proposals here, (35) would appear simultaneously to 
represent the friend as being intrinsically related to my mother and to 
identify some unspecifi ed entity with my mother. That the entity is un-
specifi ed follows from the dissolution of the frame ((N1-s)) N2). In the 
absence of a specifi ed N2 slot, the most readily available candidate con-
cept to associate with the speaker’s mother, and the one most likely to 
yield relevance, will be that expressed in the immediate linguistic con-
text by a friend.
Note that the contribution of {-s} is signifi cant. Thus, it is by no 
means given that (36), for example, ‘means’ the same as (35): Mrs 
Jones may well be a friend of my mother without necessarily being a 
friend of my mother’s. That is, (35) strongly implies that my mother 
considers Mrs Jones to be one of her friends, whereas in (36) this is not 
conveyed. In more abstract terms, and with reference to the possessive 
schema ((N1-s) N2), the specifi c instruction to integrate N2* into world 
N1* picks out N1* as the salient concept in terms of which N2* is to 
be represented. This strongly encourages the assumption that my moth-
er considers Mrs Jones to be her friend. In (36), however, N1* is not 
picked out in this way, rather the hearer is merely instructed to represent 
a friend as being intrinsic to my mother. This does not exclude a read-
ing along the lines of (35). However, it does not explicitly encourage 
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such an interpretation, so the assumption that my mother is not aware 
of Mrs. Jones being sympathetic to her remains available as a relevant 
interpretation.
Further constraints are apparent in the case of what Taylor (1996) re-
fers to as possessive nominalisations, i.e. constructions with {-s} which 
involve deverbal nouns and which can be directly related to situational 
descriptions involving agent and patient roles. The nouns involved may 
be either ‘cognitive nouns’ or ‘action nouns’ (Taylor 1996), these giving 
rise to two distinct categories known as the knowledge paradigm (cf. 
example 37 below) and the destruction paradigm (example 38) respec-
tively. The examples are Taylor’s:
(37) a. Louise’s love (for Bill)
 b. *Louise’s love (by Bill)
(38) a. the city’s destruction (by the enemy)
 b. *the cliff’s avoidance (by the hikers)
Here, a nominal like Louise’s love is amenable only to an interpretation 
in which Louise is represented as an agentive EXPERIENCER entity, 
as in (37a). Examples such as (37b), in which Louise is intended to be 
a non-agentive EXPERIENCED entity, are blocked. Similarly, the dif-
ference in acceptability between the examples in (38) is down to a dis-
tinction between the AFFECTED role of the city in (38a) and the NON-
AFFECTED role of the cliff in (38b). Thus, Taylor suggests that EXPE-
RIENCER and NON-AFFECTED entities exhibit what he calls greater 
cue validity4, or what I have referred to here as cognitive utility value. 
If we wish to verify the truth of a situation in which Bill loves Louise, 
we would turn to Bill as our most obvious source, since Louise may not 
even be aware of Bill’s love for here. Likewise to verify the cliff being 
avoided by the hikers, it would make little sense to examine the cliff as 
source, rather we would go to the hikers. Consequently, in such cases 
only EXPERIENCER and NON-AFFECTED entities will be amena-
ble to possessive marking by {-s}. My notion of cognitive utility value 
is intended to subsume Taylor’s categories of topicworthiness and cue 
4  Taylor’s distinction between categories of ‘topicworthiness’ and ‘cue validity’ is 
down to the fact that a concept of topicworthiness alone cannot account for examples 
like (37) and (38). 
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validity. As such, possessive nominalisations are accounted for in the 
same manner.
Similarly, I concur with Taylor’s construal of possessive compounds 
such as (39) and (40) in terms of a type-token distinction:
(39) children’s books
(40) doctor’s degree
The procedural semantics of {-s} is invariable across the range of pos-
sessive constructions. So (39) and (40) provide the same instruction as 
in the related prenominal possessives. However, since examples like 
(39) and (40) pick out categories rather than category members, the 
marker here operates not on tokens but on types.
How does the hearer of (41) know that he is dealing with type rather 
than token?
(41) Where are the children’s books?
Leaving aside clues deriving from prosody, we can state rather obvi-
ously that (41), when uttered, will be contextually anchored in a specif-
ic situational location. Other things being equal, in a context in which 
specifi c tokens of the entity ‘child’ are salient, assumptions relating to 
those tokens will be potentially relevant to the interpretation of an ut-
terance like (41). In a context in which the family is packing to go on 
holiday, a ‘token’ interpretation of (41) is likely to be relevant. Howev-
er, even in this case, a ‘type’ interpretation remains available, the refer-
ent of the nominal in each case being identical. In the case of (41) be-
ing uttered by a potential customer in a bookshop, however, individual 
tokens have low salience, whereas the type is extremely salient. In a 
relevance perspective, the hearer simply searches for the most readily 
available contextual assumptions on the presumption that the utterance 
is optimally relevant and that an optimally relevant interpretation is one 
which maximises cognitive effect for a minimum of processing effort. 
The interpretation of (41) follows simply from the manipulation of se-
mantic input and activated assumptions according to considerations of 
relevance.
Finally, let us very briefl y return to examples (6) and (7) above. We 
stated that these ran counter to any idea that {-s} merely predicates an 
unspecifi ed relation between entities. One explanation of their unac-
ceptability (or at least their doubtful acceptability) is that N1* is not 
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generally thought to be in any relation with N2* that might be justifi ed 
in terms of N2* being unidirectionally incorporated in world N1*. In 
other words, chips are more obviously a part of the world activated by 
the complex nominal fi sh and chips than of the world activated by fi sh 
alone. This would arguably make examples like ?the fi sh and chips’ fi sh 
marginally more acceptable.
6. Concluding remarks
Above I have presented a claim about the more exact nature of the en-
coded content of the {-s} morpheme in English. This claim is founded 
on a distinction between an invariable underdetermined semantics and 
an inferential process of comprehension to which that semantics is con-
tributes and which yields fuller conceptual representations of the mean-
ing intended to be conveyed by the speaker.
 While I am much in agreement with the fundamentals of Langack-
er’s and Taylor’s construal of the semantics of {-s} in terms of the refer-
ence-point thesis, and indeed with some of its more specifi c details, as I 
have just outlined, I do believe that relevance theory provides a poten-
tially much more satisfactory framework than the cognitive grammar 
(CG) approach on which the aforementioned approaches are founded5. 
While CG rejects the notion of an autonomous syntax and does not op-
erate with concepts like logic, propositions and truth-conditions, rele-
vance theory (RT) accords such notions crucial importance in the com-
prehension process. It is my fi rm belief that understanding utterances 
is indeed a matter of logical inference based on the representation of 
truth-evaluable propositions derived from logical forms constructed on 
the basis of linguistic input. 
More broadly, CG does not in any way account for how comprehen-
sion actually proceeds, whereas RT provides a holistic and principled 
explanation of the role of language as input to human communication. 
This article makes but a very small contribution to understanding how 
the possessive marker contributes to full-fl edged conceptual represen-
tations based on the idea of a schematic procedural semantics feeding 
into a relevance-driven process of inferential reasoning to yield famil-
5  It has not been an objective of the present paper, however, to compare or contrast 
the two approaches.
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iar possessive meanings of the kind generally identifi ed in comprehen-
sive grammars.
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